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Abstract
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must
be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of
voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of
this setting, in which voters cast approval ballots over par-
ties, such that each voter can support multiple parties. This
approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional
apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based
multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over indi-
vidual candidates. Using techniques from both apportionment
and multiwinner elections, we are able to provide representa-
tion guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general
setting of multiwinner elections: First, we show that core-
stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found
in polynomial time. Second, we demonstrate that extended
justified representation is compatible with committee mono-
tonicity.
1 Introduction
The fundamental fairness principle of proportional represen-
tation is relevant in a variety of applications ranging from
recommender systems to digital democracy (Skowron et al.
2017). It features most explicitly in the context of political
elections, which is the language we adopt for this paper. In
this context, proportional representation prescribes that the
number of representatives championing a particular opinion
in a legislature be proportional to the number of voters who
favor that opinion.
In most democratic institutions, proportional represen-
tation is implemented via party-list elections: Candidates
are members of political parties and voters are asked to
indicate their favorite party; each party is then allocated
a number of seats that is (approximately) proportional to
the number of votes it received. The problem of transform-
ing a voting outcome into a distribution of seats is known
as apportionment. Analyzing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of different apportionment methods has a long and
illustrious political history and has given rise to a deep
and elegant mathematical theory (Balinski and Young 1982;
Pukelsheim 2014).
Unfortunately, forcing voters to choose a single party pre-
vents them from communicating any preferences beyond
their most preferred alternative. For example, if a voter feels
equally well represented by several political parties, there is
no way to express this preference within the voting system.
In the context of single-winner elections, approval vot-
ing has been put forward as a solution to this problem as
it strikes an attractive compromise between simplicity and
expressivity (Brams and Fishburn 2007; Laslier and Sanver
2010). Under approval voting, each voter is asked to specify
a set of candidates she “approves of,” i.e., voters can arbi-
trarily partition the set of candidates into approved candi-
dates and disapproved ones. Proponents of approval voting
argue that its introduction could increase voter turnout, “help
elect the strongest candidate,” and “add legitimacy to the out-
come” of an election (Brams and Fishburn 2007, pp. 4–8).
Due to the practical and theoretical appeal of approval
voting in single-winner elections, a number of scholars
have suggested to also use approval voting for multiwin-
ner elections, in which a fixed number of candidates needs
to be elected (Kilgour and Marshall 2012). In contrast to
the single-winner setting, where the straightforward voting
rule “choose the candidate approved by the highest number
of voters” enjoys a strong axiomatic foundation (Fishburn
1978), several ways of aggregating approval ballots have
been proposed in the multiwinner setting (e.g., Aziz et al.
2017; Janson 2016).
Most work on approval-based multiwinner elections as-
sumes that voters directly express their preference over in-
dividual candidates; we refer to this setting as candidate-
approval elections. This assumption runs counter to
widespread democratic practice, in which candidates belong
to political parties and voters indicate preferences over these
parties (which induce an implicit preference over candi-
dates). In this paper, we therefore study party-approval elec-
tions, in which voters express approval votes over parties
and a given number of seats must be distributed among the
parties. We refer to the process of allocating these seats as
approval-based apportionment.
We believe that party-approval elections are a promising
framework for legislative elections in the real world. Allow-
ing voters to express approval votes over parties enables
the aggregation mechanism to coordinate like-minded vot-
ers. For example, two blocks of voters might currently vote
for parties that they mutually disapprove of. Using approval
ballots could reveal that the blocks jointly approve a party
of more general appeal; giving this party more seats leads
to mutual gain. This cooperation is particularly necessary
for small minority opinions that are not centrally coordi-
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nated. In such cases, finding a commonly approved party can
make the difference between being represented or votes be-
ing wasted because the individual parties receive insufficient
support.
In contrast to approval voting over individual candidates,
party-approval voting does not require a break with the cur-
rent role of political parties—it can be combined with both
“open list” and “closed list” approaches to filling the seats
allocated to a party.
1.1 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to for-
mally develop and systematically study approval-based ap-
portionment. That is not to say that the idea of expressing
and aggregating approval votes over parties has not been con-
sidered before. Indeed, several scholars have explored possi-
ble generalizations of existing aggregation procedures.
For instance, Brams, Kilgour, and Potthoff (2019) study
multiwinner approval rules that are inspired by classical ap-
portionment methods. Besides the setting of candidate ap-
proval, they explicitly consider the case where voters cast
party-approval votes. They conclude that these rules could
“encourage coalitions across party or factional lines, thereby
diminishing gridlock and promoting consensus.”
Such desire of compromise is only one motivation for con-
sidering party-approval elections, as exemplified by recent
work by Speroni di Fenizio and Gewurz (2019). To allow for
more efficient governing, they aim to concentrate the power
of a legislature in the hands of few big parties, while nonethe-
less preserving the principle of proportional representation.
To this end, they let voters cast party-approval votes and
transform these votes into a party-list election by assigning
each voter to one of her approved parties. One method for
doing this (referred to as majoritarian portioning later in
this paper) assigns voters to parties in such a way that the
strongest party has as many votes as possible.
Several other papers consider extensions of approval-
based voting rules to accommodate party-approval elec-
tions (Brams and Kilgour 2014; Mora and Oliver 2015;
Janson 2016; Janson and O¨berg 2019). All of these papers
have in common that they study specific rules or classes of
rules, rather than exploring the party-approval setting in its
own right.
1.2 Relation to Other Settings
Party-approval elections can be positioned between two
well-studied voting settings (see Figure 1).
First, approval-based apportionment generalizes standard
apportionment, which corresponds to party-approval elec-
tions in which all votes are singletons. This relation (de-
picted as arrow (i) in Figure 1) provides a generic two-step
approach to define aggregation rules for approval-based ap-
portionment problems: transform a party-approval instance
to an apportionment instance, and then apply an apportion-
ment method. In Section 3, we employ this approach to con-
struct approval-based apportionment methods satisfying de-
sirable properties.
Second, our setting can be viewed as a special case of
approval-based multiwinner voting, in which voters cast
Candidate-approval elections
(Kilgour and Marshall 2012; Aziz et al. 2017)
Party-approval elections
[approval-based apportionment]
Party-list elections [apportionment]
(Balinski and Young 1982; Pukelsheim 2014)
(ii)
(i)
(iii)
Figure 1: Relations between the different settings of multi-
winner elections. An arrow fromX to Y signifies thatX is a
generalization of Y . The relationship corresponding to arrow
(iii) has been explored by Brill, Laslier, and Skowron (2018).
We establish and explore the relationship (i) in Section 3 and
the relationship (ii) in Section 4.
candidate-approval votes. A party-approval election can be
embedded in this setting by replacing each party by multi-
ple candidates belonging to this party, and by interpreting a
voter’s approval of a party as approval of all of its candidates.
This embedding establishes party-approval elections as a
subdomain of candidate-approval elections (see arrow (ii) in
Figure 1). In Section 4, we explore the axiomatic and com-
putational ramifications of this domain restriction.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we formally introduce the setting of approval-
based apportionment and explore different possibilities of
constructing axiomatically desirable aggregation methods
for this setting. Besides its conceptual appeal, this setting
is also interesting from a technical perspective.
Exploiting the relations described in Section 1.2, we re-
solve problems that remain open in the more general set-
ting of approval-based multiwinner voting. First, we prove
that committee monotonicity is compatible with extended
justified representation (a representation axiom proposed
by Aziz et al. 2017) by providing a rulemethod that satis-
fies both properties. Second, we show that the core of an
approval-based apportionment problem is always nonempty
and that core-stable committees can be found in polynomial
time.
Besides these positive results, we verify for a wide range
of multiwinner voting rules that their axiomatic guarantees
do not improve in the party-approval setting, and that some
rules remain NP-hard to evaluate. On the other hand, we
show that it becomes tractable to check whether a commit-
tee provides extended justified representation or the weaker
axiom of proportional justified representation.
Omitted proofs as well as further definitions and results
can be found in Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
A party-approval election is a tuple (N,P,A, k) consisting
of a set of votersN = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set of parties P , a
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ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) where each ballot Ai ⊆ P
is the set of parties approved by voter i, and the committee
size k ∈ N. We assume that Ai 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N . When
considering computational problems, we assume that k is
encoded in unary (see Footnote 5).
A committee in this setting is a multiset W : P → N
over parties, which determines the number of seats W (p)
assigned to each party p ∈ P . The size of a committee
W is given by |W | =
∑
p∈P W (p), and we denote mul-
tiset addition and subtraction by + and −, respectively. A
party-approval rule is a function that takes a party-approval
election (N,P,A, k) as input and returns a committeeW of
valid size |W | = k.1
In our axiomatic study of party-approval rules, we fo-
cus on two axioms capturing proportional representation: ex-
tended justified representation and core stability (Aziz et al.
2017).2 Both axioms are derived from their analogs in mul-
tiwinner elections (see Section 4.2) and can be defined in
terms of quota requirements.
For a party-approval election (N,P,A, k) and a subset
S ⊆ N of voters, define the quota of S as q(S) = ⌊k·|S|/n⌋.
Intuitively, q(S) corresponds to the number of seats that the
group S “deserves” to be represented by (rounded down).
Definition 1. A committee W : P → N provides extended
justified representation (EJR) for a party-approval election
(N,P,A, k) if there is no subset S ⊆ N of voters such that⋂
i∈S Ai 6= ∅ and
∑
p∈Ai
W (p) < q(S) for all i ∈ S.
In words, EJR requires that for every voter group S with
a commonly approved party, at least one voter of the group
should be represented by q(S) many candidates. A party-
approval rule is said to satisfy EJR if it only produces com-
mittees providing EJR.
We can obtain a stronger representation axiom by remov-
ing the requirement of a commonly approved party.
Definition 2. A committeeW : P → N is core stable for a
party-approval election (N,P,A, k) if there is no nonempty
subset S ⊆ N and committee T : P → N of size |T | 6 q(S)
such that
∑
p∈Ai
T (p) >
∑
p∈Ai
W (p) for all i ∈ S. The
core of a party-approval election is defined as the set of all
core-stable committees.
Core stability requires adequate representation even for
voter groups that cannot agree on a common party, by rul-
ing out the possibility that the group can deviate to a smaller
committee that represents all voters in the group strictly bet-
ter. It follows from the definitions that core stability is a
stronger requirement than EJR: If a committee violates EJR,
there is a group S that would prefer any committee of size
q(S) that assigns all seats to the commonly approved party.
1This definition implies that rules are resolute, that is, only a
single committee is returned. In the case of a tie between multiple
committees, a tiebreaking mechanism is necessary. Our results hold
independently of the choice of a specific tiebreaking mechanism.
2Some results in the appendix refer to the weaker representa-
tion axioms of justified representation (JR) (Aziz et al. 2017) and
proportional justified representation (PJR) (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et
al. 2017); see Appendix A.1. It is well known that EJR implies PJR
and that PJR implies JR.
A final, non-representational axiom that we will discuss
is committee monotonicity. A party-approval rule f satisfies
this axiom if, for all party-approval elections (N,P,A, k), it
holds that f(N,P,A, k) ⊆ f(N,P,A, k + 1). Committee
monotonic rules avoid the so-called Alabama paradox, in
which a party loses a seat when the committee size increases.
Besides, committee monotonic rules can be used to construct
proportional rankings (Skowron et al. 2017).
3 Constructing Party-Approval Rules via
Portioning and Apportionment
Party-approval elections are a generalization of party-list
elections, which can be thought of as party-approval elec-
tions in which all approval sets are singletons. Since there is
a rich body of research on apportionment methods, it is nat-
ural to examine whether we can employ these methods for
our setting as well. To use them, we will need to translate
party-approval elections into the party-list domain on which
apportionment methods operate. This translation thus needs
to transform approval votes over parties into a target percent-
age for each party. Motivated by time sharing, Bogomolnaia,
Moulin, and Stong (2005) have developed a theory of such
transformation rules, further studied by Duddy (2015) and
Aziz, Bogomolnaia, andMoulin (2019).We will refer to this
framework as portioning.
The approach explored in this section, then, divides the
construction of a party-approval rule into two independent
steps: (1) portioning, which maps a party-approval election
to a vector of parties’ shares; followed by (2) apportionment,
which transforms the shares into a seat distribution.
Both the portioning and the apportionment literature have
discussed representation axioms similar in spirit to EJR and
core stability. For both settings, several rules have been
found to satisfy these properties. One might hope that by
composing two rules that are each representative, we obtain
a party-approval rule that is also representative (and satisfies,
say, EJR). If we succeed in finding such a combination, it is
likely that the resulting voting rule will automatically satisfy
committee monotonicity since most apportionment methods
satisfy this property. In the general candidate-approval set-
ting (considered in Section 4), the existence of a rule sat-
isfying both EJR and committee monotonicity is an open
problem.
3.1 Preliminaries
We start by introducing relevant notions from the litera-
ture of portioning (Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong 2005;
Aziz, Bogomolnaia, and Moulin 2019) and apportionment
(Balinski and Young 1982; Pukelsheim 2014), with nota-
tions and interpretations suitably adjusted to our setting.
Portioning A portioning problem is a triple (N,P,A),
just as in party-approval voting but without a committee
size. A portioning is a function r : P → [0, 1] with∑
p∈P r(p) = 1. We interpret r(p) as the “vote share” of
party p. A portioning method maps each triple (N,P,A) to
a portioning.
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Our minimum requirement on portioning methods will be
that they uphold proportionality if all approval sets are sin-
gletons, i.e., if we are already in the party-list domain. For-
mally, we say that a portioning method is faithful if for all
(N,P,A) with |Ai| = 1 for all i ∈ N , the resulting portion-
ing r satisfies r(p) = |{i ∈ N | Ai = {p}}|/n for all p ∈ P .
Among the portioning methods considered by Aziz, Bogo-
molnaia, and Moulin (2019), only three are faithful. They
are defined as follows.
Conditional utilitarian portioning selects, for each voter i,
pi as a party in Ai approved by the highest number of
voters. Then, r(p) = |{i ∈ N | p = pi}|/n for all p ∈ P .
Random priority computes n! portionings, one for each per-
mutation σ of N , and returns their average. The portion-
ing for σ = (i1, . . . , in) maximizes
∑
p∈Ai1
r(p), break-
ing ties by maximizing
∑
p∈Ai2
r(p), and so forth.
Nash portioning selects the portioning r maximizing the
Nash welfare
∏
i∈N
(∑
p∈Ai
r(p)
)
.
The last method seems particularly promising because it sat-
isfies portioning versions of core stability and EJR (Aziz,
Bogomolnaia, and Moulin 2019).
We will also make use of a more recent portioning ap-
proach, which was proposed by Speroni di Fenizio and
Gewurz (2019) in the context of party-approval voting.
Majoritarian portioning proceeds in rounds j = 1, 2, . . . .
Initially, all parties and voters are active. In iteration j, we
select the active party pj that is approved by the highest
number of active voters. LetNj be the set of active voters
who approve pj . Then, set r(pj) to |Nj|/n, and mark pj
and all voters in Nj as inactive. If active voters remain,
the next iteration is started; else, r is returned.
Under majoritarian portioning, the approval preferences of
voters who have been assigned to a party are ignored in fur-
ther iterations. Note that conditional utilitarian portioning
can similarly be seen as a sequential method, in which the
preferences of inactive voters are not ignored.
Apportionment An apportionment problem is a tuple
(P, r, k), which consists of a finite set of parties P , a por-
tioning r : P → [0, 1] specifying the vote shares of parties,
and a committee size k ∈ N. Committees are defined as
for party-approval elections, and an apportionment method
maps apportionment problems to committeesW of size k.
An apportionment method satisfies lower quota if each
party p is always allocated at least ⌊k · r(p)⌋ seats in the
committee. Furthermore, an apportionmentmethod f is com-
mittee monotonic if f(P, r, k) ⊆ f(P, r, k + 1) for every
apportionment problem (P, r, k).
Among the standard apportionment methods, only one
satisfies both lower quota and committee monotonicity: the
D’Hondt method (aka Jefferson method).3 The method as-
signs the k seats iteratively, each time giving the next seat to
the party p with the largest quotient r(p)/(s(p) + 1), where
3All other divisor methods fail lower quota, and the Hamilton
method is not committee monotonic (Balinski and Young 1982).
s(p) denotes the number of seats already assigned to p. An-
other apportionmentmethod satisfying lower quota and com-
mittee monotonicity is the quota method, due to Balinski
and Young (1975). It is identical to the D’Hondt method,
except that, in the jth iteration, only parties p satisfying
s(p)/j < r(p) are eligible for the allocation of the next seat.
Composition If we take any portioning method and any
apportionment method, we can compose them to obtain a
party-approval rule. Note that if the apportionment method
is committee monotonic then so is the composed rule, since
the portioning is independent of k.
3.2 Composed Rules That Fail EJR
Perhaps surprisingly, many pairs of portioning and appor-
tionment methods fail EJR. This is certainly true if the indi-
vidual parts are not representative themselves. For example,
if an apportionment method M properly fails lower quota
(in the sense that there is a rational-valued input r on which
lower quota is violated), then one can construct an example
profile on which any composed rule usingM fails EJR: Con-
struct a party-approval election with singleton approval sets
in which the voter counts are proportional to the shares in
the counter-example r. Then any faithful portioning method,
applied to this election, must return r. Since M fails lower
quota on r, the resulting committee will violate EJR. By
a similar argument, an apportionment method that violates
committee monotonicity on some rational portioning will,
when composed with a faithful portioning method, give rise
to a party-approval rule that fails committee monotonicity.
To our knowledge, among the named and studied appor-
tionment methods, only two satisfy both lower quota and
committee monotonicity: D’Hondt and the quota method.
However, it turns out that the composition of either option
with the conditional-utilitarian, random-priority, or Nash
portioning methods fails EJR, as the following examples
show.
Example 1. Let n = k = 6, P = {p0, p1, p2, p3}, A =
({p0}, {p0}, {p0, p1, p2}, {p0, p1, p2}, {p1, p3}, {p2, p3}).
Then, the conditional utilitarian solution sets r(p0) =
4/6, r(p1) = r(p2) = 1/6, and r(p3) = 0. Any appor-
tionment method satisfying lower quota allocates four seats
to p0, one each to p1 and p2, and none to p3. The resulting
committee does not provide EJR since the last two voters,
who jointly approve p3, have a quota of q({5, 6}) = 2 that
is not met.
Example 2. Let n = k = 6, P = {p0, p1, p2, p3}, and A =
({p0}, {p0}, {p0, p1, p2}, {p0, p1, p3}, {p1}, {p2, p3}).
Random priority chooses the portioning r(p0) = 23/45,
r(p1) = 23/90, and r(p2) = r(p3) = 7/60. Both D’Hondt
and the quota method allocate four seats to p0, two seats to
p1, and none to the other two parties. This clearly violates
the claim to representation of the sixth voter (with q({6}) =
1).
Nash portioning produces a fairly similar portioning, with
r(p0) ≈ 0.5302, r(p1) ≈ 0.2651, and r(p2) = r(p3) ≈
0.1023. D’Hondt and the quota method produce the same
committee as above, leading to the same EJR violation.
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At first glance, it might be surprising that Nash portion-
ing combined with a lower-quota apportionment method vi-
olates EJR (and even the weaker axiom JR). Indeed, Nash
portioning satisfies core stability in the portioning setting,
which is a strong notion of proportionality, and the lower-
quota property limits the rounding losses when moving from
the portioning to a committee. As expected, in the election of
Example 2, the Nash solution itself gives sufficient represen-
tation to the sixth voter since r(p2)+r(p3) ≈ 0.2047 > 1/6.
However, since both r(p2) and r(p3) are below 1/6 on their
own, lower quota does not apply to either of the two parties,
and the sixth voter loses all representation in the apportion-
ment step.
3.3 Composed Rules That Satisfy EJR
Aswe have seen, several initially promising portioningmeth-
ods fail to compose to a rule that satisfies EJR. One reason
is that these portioning methods are happy to assign small
shares to several parties. The apportionment method may
round several of those small shares down to zero seats. This
can lead to a failure of EJR when not enough parties obtain a
seat. It is difficult for an apportionment method to avoid this
behavior since the portioning step obscures the relationships
between different parties that are apparent from the approval
ballots of the voters.
Majoritarian portioning is designed to maximize the size
of parties. Thus, it tends to avoid the problem we have
identified. While it fails the strong representation axioms
that Nash portioning satisfies, this turns out not be crucial:
Composing majoritarian portioning with any apportionment
method satisfying lower quota yields an EJR rule. If we use
an apportionment method that is also committee monotonic,
such as D’Hondt or the quota method, we obtain a party-
approval rule that satisfies both EJR and committee mono-
tonicity.4
Theorem 1. Let M be a committee monotonic appor-
tionment method satisfying lower quota. Then, the party-
approval rule composing majoritarian portioning and M
satisfies EJR and committee monotonicity.
Proof. Consider a party-approval election (N,P,A, k) and
let r be the outcome of majoritarian portioning applied
to (N,P,A). Let N1, N2, . . . and p1, p2, . . . be the voter
groups and parties in the construction of majoritarian por-
tioning, so that r(pj) = |Nj |/n for all j.
Consider the committee W = M(P, r, k) and suppose
that EJR is violated, i.e., that there exists a group S ⊆ N
with
⋂
i∈S Ai 6= ∅ and
∑
p∈Ai
W (p) < q(S) for all i ∈ S.
Let j be minimal such that S∩Nj 6= ∅. We now show that
|S| 6 |Nj |. By the definition of j, no voter in S approves
of any of the parties p1, p2, . . . pj−1; thus, all those voters
remain active in round j. Consider a party p∗ ∈
⋂
i∈S Ai.
In the jth iteration of majoritarian portioning, this party had
an approval score of at least |S|. Therefore, the party pj that
is chosen in the jth iteration has an approval score that is at
4As long as the apportionment method is computable in poly-
nomial time (which is the case for D’Hondt and the quota method),
the same holds for the resulting party-approval rule.
least |S| (of course, p∗ = pj is possible). The approval score
of party pj equals |Nj |. Therefore, |Nj | > |S|.
Since |Nj | > |S|, we have q(Nj) > q(S). Since M
satsifies lower quota, it assigns at least ⌊k · r(pj)⌋ =
⌊k(|Nj|/n)⌋ = q(Nj) seats to party pj . Now consider a
voter i ∈ S ∩ Nj . Since this voter approves party pj , we
have
∑
p∈Ai
W (p) > W (pj) > q(Nj) > q(S), a contradic-
tion.
This shows that EJR is indeed satisfied; committee
monotonicity follows from the committee monotonicity of
M .
While the party-approval rules identified by Theorem 1
satisfy EJR and committee monotonicity, they do not quite
reach our gold standard of representation, i.e., core stability.
Example 3. Let n = k = 16, let P = {p0, . . . , p4}, with the
following approval sets: 4 times {p0, p1}, 3 times {p1, p2},
once {p2}, 4 times {p0, p3}, 3 times {p3, p4}, and once
{p4}. Note the symmetry between p1 and p3, and between p2
and p4. Majoritarian portioning allocates 1/2 to p0 and 1/4
each to p2 and p4. Any lower-quota apportionment method
must translate this into 8 seats for p0 and 4 seats each for
p2 and p4. This committee is not in the core: Let S be the
coalition of all 14 voters who approve multiple parties, and
let T allocate 4 seats to p0 and 5 seats each to p1 and p3.
This gives strictly higher representation to all members of
the coalition.
The example makes it obvious why majoritarian portion-
ing cannot satisfy the core: All voters approving of p0 get
deactivated after the first round, which makes p2 seem uni-
versally preferable to p1. However, p1 is a useful vehicle for
cooperation between the group approving {p0, p1} and the
group approving {p1, p2}. Since majoritarian portioning is
blind to this opportunity, it cannot guarantee core stability.
The example also illustrates the power of core stability:
The deviating coalition does not agree on any single party
they support, but would nonetheless benefit from the devi-
ation. There is room for collaboration, and core stability is
sensitive to this demand for better representation.
4 Constructing Party-Approval Rules via
Multiwinner Voting Rules
In the previous section, we applied tools from apportion-
ment, a more restrictive setting, to our party-approval set-
ting. Now, we go in the other direction, and apply tools
from a more general setting: As mentioned in Section 1.2,
party-approval elections can be viewed as a special case of
candidate-approval elections, i.e., multiwinner elections in
which approvals are expressed over individual candidates
rather than parties. After introducing relevant candidate-
approval notions, we show how party-approval elections can
be translated into candidate-approval elections. This embed-
ding allows us to apply established candidate-approval rules
to our setting. Exploiting this fact, we will prove the exis-
tence of core-stable committees for party-approval elections.
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4.1 Preliminaries
A candidate-approval election is a tuple (N,C,A, k). Just
as for party-approval elections, N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of
voters, C is a finite set, A is an n-tuple of nonempty subsets
of C, and k ∈ N is the committee size. The conceptual dif-
ference is that C is a set of individual candidates rather than
parties. This difference manifests itself in the definition of a
committee because a single candidate cannot receive multi-
ple seats. That is, a candidate committee W is now simply
a subset of C with cardinality k. (Therefore, it is usually
assumed that |C| > k.) A candidate-approval rule is a func-
tion that maps each candidate-approval election to a candi-
date committee.
A diverse set of such voting rules has been proposed
since the late 19th century (Kilgour and Marshall 2012;
Aziz et al. 2017; Janson 2016), out of which we will
only introduce the one which we use for our main posi-
tive result. Let Hj denote the jth harmonic number, i.e.,
Hj =
∑
16t6j 1/t. Given (N,C,A, k), the candidate-
approval rule proportional approval voting (PAV), intro-
duced by Thiele (1895), chooses a candidate committee W
maximizing the PAV score PAV(W ) =
∑
i∈N H|W∩Ai|.
We now describe EJR and core stability in the candidate-
approval setting, from which our versions of these axioms
are derived. Recall that q(S) = ⌊k |S|/n⌋. A candidate com-
mittee W provides EJR if there is no subset S ⊆ N and
no integer ℓ > 0 such that q(S) > ℓ, |
⋂
i∈S Ai| > ℓ, and
|Ai∩W | < ℓ for all i ∈ S. (The requirement |
⋂
i∈S Ai| > ℓ
is often referred to as cohesiveness.) A candidate-approval
rule satisfies EJR if it always produces EJR committees.
The definition of core stability is even closer to the version
in party-approval: A candidate committee W is core stable
if there is no nonempty group S ⊆ N and no set T ⊆ C of
size |T | 6 q(S) such that |Ai ∩T | > |Ai ∩W | for all i ∈ S.
The core consists of all core-stable candidate committees.
4.2 Embedding Party-Approval Elections
We have informally argued in Section 1.2 that party-approval
elections constitute a subdomain of candidate-approval elec-
tions. We formalize this notion by providing an embed-
ding of party-approval elections into the candidate-approval
domain. For a given party-approval election (N,P,A, k),
we define a corresponding candidate-approval election with
the same set of voters N and the same committee size k.
The set of candidates contains k many “clone” candidates
p(1), . . . , p(k) for each party p ∈ P , and a voter approves a
candidate p(j) in the candidate-approval election iff she ap-
proves the corresponding party p in the party-approval elec-
tion. This embedding establishes party-approval elections as
a subdomain of candidate-approval elections. As a conse-
quence, we can apply rules and axioms from the more gen-
eral candidate-approval setting also in the party-approval set-
ting.
In particular, the generic way to apply a candidate-
approval rule for a party-approval election consists in (1)
translating the party-approval election into a candidate-
approval election, (2) applying the candidate-approval rule,
and (3) counting the number of chosen clones per party to
construct a committee over parties. Note that, since k is en-
coded in unary, the running time is blown up by at most a
polynomial factor.5
Having established party-approval elections as a subdo-
main of candidate-approval elections, our variants of EJR
and core stability (Definitions 1 and 2) are immediately in-
duced by their candidate-approval counterparts. In particu-
lar, any candidate-approval rule satisfying an axiom in the
candidate-approval setting will satisfy the corresponding ax-
iom in the party-approval setting as well. Note that, by re-
stricting our view to party approval, the cohesiveness re-
quirement of EJR is reduced to requiring a single commonly
approved party.
4.3 PAV Guarantees Core Stability
A powerful stability concept in economics, core stability is a
natural extension of EJR. It is particularly attractive because
blocking coalitions are not required to be coherent at all, just
to be able to coordinate for mutual gain. Our earlier Exam-
ple 3 illustrates how a coalition might deviate in spite of not
agreeing on any approved party.
Unfortunately, it is still unknownwhether core-stable can-
didate committees exist for all candidate-approval elections.
Fain, Munagala, and Shah (2018) give positive approximate
results for a variant of core stability in which blocking coali-
tions S ⊆ N get to provide sets of candidates T of size k
but have to increase their utilities by at least a factor of
n/|S| to be counterexamples to their notion of core stability.
They provide a nonconstant approximation to the core in our
sense, but nonemptyness remains open. Recently, Cheng et
al. (2019) showed that there always exist randomized com-
mittees providing core stability (over expected representa-
tion), but it is not clear how their approach based on two-
player zero-sum game duality would extend to deterministic
committees.
All standard candidate-approval rules either already fail
weaker representation axioms such as EJR or fail the core. In
particular, Aziz et al. (2017) have shown that PAV satisfies
EJR, but may produce non-core-stable candidate committees
even for candidate-approval elections for which core-stable
candidate committees are known to exist.
By contrast, we show that PAV guarantees core stability
in the party-approval setting. We follow the structure of the
aforementioned proof showing that PAV satisfies EJR for
candidate-approval elections (Aziz et al. 2017).
Theorem 2. For every party-approval election, PAV chooses
a core-stable committee.
Proof. Consider a party-approval election (N,P,A, k) and
letW : P → N be the committee selected by PAV. Assume
5For candidate-approval elections, it does not make sense to
have more seats than candidates, whereas for party-approval elec-
tions it is natural to have more seats than parties. If k was encoded
in binary, even greedy candidate-approval algorithms would sud-
denly have exponential running time; this would make running
times between candidate approval and party-approval hard to com-
pare and would blur the intuitive distinction between simple and
complex algorithms. Encoding k in unary sidesteps this technical
complication.
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for contradiction that W is not core stable. Then, there is a
nonempty coalition S and a committee T : P → N such that
|T | 6 k |S|/n and
∑
p∈Ai
T (p) >
∑
p∈Ai
W (p) for every
voter i ∈ S.
Let ui(W ) denote the number of seats in W that are
allocated to parties approved by voter i, i.e., ui(W ) =∑
p∈Ai
W (p). Furthermore, for a party p with W (p) > 0,
we let MC (p,W ) denote the marginal contribution to the
PAV score of allocating a seat to p, i.e., MC (p,W ) =
PAV(W ) − PAV(W − {p}). Observe that MC (p,W ) =∑
i∈Np
1/ui(W ), where Np = {i ∈ N | p ∈ Ai}. The sum
of all marginal contributions satisfies
∑
p∈P
W (p)MC (p,W ) =
∑
p∈P
∑
i∈Np
W (p)
ui(W )
=
∑
i∈N
∑
p∈Ai
W (p)
ui(W )
= |{i ∈ N | ui(W ) > 0}| 6 n.
Note that terms MC (p,W ) for W (p) = 0 and quotients
1/ui(W ) for ui(W ) = 0 are undefined in the calculation
above, but that they only appear with factor 0.
It follows that the average marginal contribution of all k
seats in W is at most n/k, and consequently, that there has
to be a party p1 with a seat in W such that MC (p1,W ) 6
n/k. Using a similar argument, we show that there is also
a party p2 with T (p2) > 0 which would increase the PAV
score by at least n/k if it received an additional seat inW :
∑
p∈P
T (p)MC (p,W + {p}) =
∑
i∈N
∑
p∈Ai
T (p)
ui(W + {p})
>
∑
i∈S
∑
p∈Ai
T (p)
ui(W + {p})
=
∑
i∈S
∑
p∈Ai
T (p)
ui(W ) + 1
>
∑
i∈S
∑
p∈Ai
T (p)
ui(T )
= |{i ∈ S | ui(T ) > 0}| = |S|.
The second inequality holds because every voter in S strictly
increases their utility when deviating fromW to T ; the last
equality holds because every voter in S must get some rep-
resentation in T to deviate. As desired, it follows that there
has to be a party p2 in the support of T with MC (p2,W +
{p2}) > |S|/|T | > n/k.
If any of these inequalities would be strict, that is, if
MC (p1,W ) < n/k or MC (p2,W + {p2}) > n/k, then
the committeeW −{p1}+ {p2} would have a PAV-score of
PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W−{p1}+{p2})
(1)
> PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W+{p2})>PAV(W ),
which would contradict the choice ofW .
Else, suppose that MC (p,W ) = n/k for all parties p
in the support of W and MC (p,W + {p}) = n/k for all
parties p in the support of T . If there is a party p1 in W
that is approved by some voter i ∈ S, we can choose an
arbitrary party p2 from the support of T that i approves
as well. Then, for voter i, the marginal contribution of p2
in W − {p1} + {p2} is
1
ui(W−{p1}+{p2})
= 1
ui(W )
, but
the marginal contribution of p2 in W + {p2} for i is only
1
ui(W+{p2})
= 1
ui(W )+1
. This impliesMC (p2,W − {p1}+
{p2}) > MC (p2,W + {p2}), which makes inequality (1)
strict and again contradicts the optimality ofW .
Thus, one has to assume that no voter in S approves any
party in the support of W . Pick an arbitrary p in the sup-
port of T , and recall that MC (p′,W + {p′}) = n/k for all
p′ in the support of T . Thus, all inequalities in the deriva-
tion of
∑
p∈P T (p)MC (p,W + {p}) > |S| above must
be equalities, which implies that this increase in PAV score
must solely come from voters in S. Thus, there are at least
n/k voters in S who are not represented at all in W , but
commonly approve p. This would be a violation of EJR, con-
tradicting the fact that PAV satisfies this axiom.
Corollary 3. The core of a party-approval election is
nonempty.
An immediate follow-up question is whether core-stable
committees can be computed efficiently. PAV committees
are known to be NP-hard to compute in the candidate-
approval setting, and we confirm in Appendix B.1 that hard-
ness still holds in the party-approval subdomain.
Equally confronted with the computational complexity of
PAV, Aziz et al. (2018) proposed a local-search variant of
PAV, which runs in polynomial time and guarantees EJR in
the candidate-approval setting. Using the same approach, we
can find a core-stable committee in the party-approval set-
ting. We defer the proof to Appendix B.2.
Theorem 4. Given a party-approval election, a core-stable
committee can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 2 motivates the question of whether other
candidate-approval rules satisfy stronger representation ax-
ioms when restricted to the party-approval subdomain. We
have studied this question for various rules besides PAV, and
the answer was always negative.6
While the party-approval setting does not reduce the com-
plexity of computing PAV, it allows us to check efficiently
check whether a given committee provides EJR or PJR; both
problems are coNP-hard in the candidate-approval setting
(Aziz et al. 2017; 2018). For EJR, this follows from coher-
ence becoming simpler for party-approval elections. Our al-
gorithm for checking PJR employs submodular minimiza-
tion. For details, we refer to Appendix B.3.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have initiated the axiomatic analysis
of approval-based apportionment. On a technical level,
it would be interesting to investigate whether the party-
approval domain allows to satisfy other combinations of ax-
ioms that are (currently) not attainable in candidate-approval
6We consider the candidate-approval rules SeqPAV, RevSe-
qPAV, Approval Voting (AV), SatisfactionAV, MinimaxAV, Se-
qPhragme´n, MaxPhragme´n, VarPhragme´n, Phragme´n-STV, Mon-
roeAV, GreedyMonroeAV, GreedyAV, HareAV, and Chamberlin–
CourantAV. Besides EJR and core stability, we consider JR and
PJR (see Footnote 2). Definitions and results can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
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elections. For instance, it is not known whether strong repre-
sentation axioms are compatible with certain notions of sup-
port monotonicity (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus 2019).
We have presented our setting guided by the application
of apportioning parliamentary seats to political parties. We
believe that this is an attractive application worthy of practi-
cal experimentation. Our formal setting has other interesting
applications. An example would be participatory budgeting
settings in which the provision of items of equal cost is de-
cided, where the items come in different types. For instance,
a university department could decide how to allocate Ph.D.
scholarships across different research projects, in a way that
respects the preferences of funding organizations.
As another example, the literature on multiwinner elec-
tions suggests many applications to recommendation prob-
lems (Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang 2016). For instance,
one might want to display a limited number of news articles,
movies, or advertisements in a way that fairly represents the
preferences of the audience. These preferences might be ex-
pressed not over individual pieces of content, but over con-
tent producers (such as newspapers, studios, or advertising
companies), in which case our setting provides rules that de-
cide how many items should be contributed by each source.
Expressing preferences on the level of content producers is
natural in repeated settings, where the relevant pieces of con-
tent change too frequently to elicit voter preferences on each
occasion. Besides, content producers might reserve the right
to choose which of their content should be displayed.
In the general candidate-approval setting, the search con-
tinues for rules that satisfy EJR and committee monotonicity,
or core stability. But for the applications mentioned above,
these guarantees are already achievable today.
Acknowledgements This work was partially supported
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under Grant BR
4744/2-1. We thank Steven Brams and Piotr Skowron for
suggesting the setting of party approval to us, and we thank
Anne-Marie George, Ayumi Igarashi, Svante Janson, Je´roˆme
Lang, and Ariel Procaccia for helpful comments and discus-
sions.
References
Aziz, H.; Gaspers, S.; Gudmundsson, J.; Mackenzie, S.; Mat-
tei, N.; and Walsh, T. 2015. Computational aspects of multi-
winner approval voting. In Proceedings of the 14th Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS), 107–115.
Aziz, H.; Brill, M.; Conitzer, V.; Elkind, E.; Freeman,
R.; and Walsh, T. 2017. Justified representation in
approval-based committee voting. Social Choice and Wel-
fare 48(2):461–485.
Aziz, H.; Elkind, E.; Huang, S.; Lackner, M.; Sa´nchez-
Ferna´ndez, L.; and Skowron, P. 2018. On the complexity of
extended and proportional justified representation. In Pro-
ceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence (AAAI), 902–909.
Aziz, H.; Bogomolnaia, A.; and Moulin, H. 2019. Fair mix-
ing: The case of dichotomous preferences. In Proceedings of
the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
(EC), 753–781.
Aziz, H. 2017. A note on justified representation under the
reverse sequential PAV rule. Unpublishedmanuscript. Avail-
able at http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/∼haziz/invseqpav.pdf.
Balinski, M. L., and Young, H. P. 1975. The quota method
of apportionment. The American Mathematical Monthly
82(7):701–730.
Balinski, M., and Young, H. P. 1982. Fair Representation:
Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. Yale University
Press.
Bogomolnaia, A.; Moulin, H.; and Stong, R. 2005. Col-
lective choice under dichotomous preferences. Journal of
Economic Theory 122(2):165–184.
Brams, S. J., and Fishburn, P. C. 2007. Approval Voting.
Springer, 2nd edition.
Brams, S. J., and Kilgour, D. M. 2014. Satisfaction approval
voting. In Voting Power and Procedures, Studies in Choice
and Welfare. Springer. 323–346.
Brams, S. J.; Kilgour, D. M.; and Potthoff, R. F. 2019. Multi-
winner approval voting: an apportionment approach. Public
Choice 178(1–2):67–93.
Brams, S. J.; Kilgour, D. M.; and Sanver, M. R. 2007. A
minimax procedure for electing committees. Public Choice
132:401–420.
Brill, M.; Freeman, R.; Janson, S.; and Lackner, M. 2017.
Phragme´n’s voting methods and justified representation. In
Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (AAAI), 406–413.
Brill, M.; Laslier, J.-F.; and Skowron, P. 2018. Multiwinner
approval rules as apportionment methods. Journal of Theo-
retical Politics 30(3):358–382.
Camps, R.; Mora, X.; and Saumell, L. 2019. The
method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n for parliamentary elec-
tions by means of approval voting. Technical report,
arxiv:1907.10590.
Chamberlin, J. R., and Courant, P. N. 1983. Representative
deliberations and representative decisions: Proportional rep-
resentation and the Borda rule. American Political Science
Review 77(3):718–733.
Cheng, Y.; Jiang, Z.; Munagala, K.; and Wang, K. 2019.
Group Fairness in Committee Selection. In Proceedings of
the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
(EC), 263–279.
Duddy, C. 2015. Fair sharing under dichotomous prefer-
ences. Mathematical Social Sciences 73:1–5.
Fain, B.; Munagala, K.; and Shah, N. 2018. Fair allocation
of indivisible public goods. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 575–592.
Fishburn, P. C. 1978. Axioms for approval voting: Direct
proof. Journal of Economic Theory 19(1):180–185.
Garey, M. R., and Johnson, D. S. 1979. Computers and
Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness.
W. H. Freeman.
8
Janson, S., and O¨berg, A. 2019. A piecewise contractive
dynamical system and Phragme´n’s election method. Bulletin
de la Socie´te´ Mathe´matique de France 147(3):395–441.
Janson, S. 2016. Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s election methods.
Technical report, arxiv:1611.08826.
Kilgour, D. M., and Marshall, E. 2012. Approval balloting
for fixed-size committees. In Electoral Systems, Studies in
Choice and Welfare. Springer. 305–326.
Korte, B., and Vygen, J. 2018. Combinatorial Optimization.
Springer, 6th edition.
Laslier, J.-F., and Sanver, M. R., eds. 2010. Handbook on
Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer.
Monroe, B. L. 1995. Fully proportional representation.
American Political Science Review 89(4):925–940.
Mora, X., and Oliver, M. 2015. Eleccions mitjanc¸ant el
vot d’aprovacio´. El me`tode de Phragme´n i algunes variants.
Butlletı´ de la Societat Catalana de Matema`tiques 30(1):57–
101.
Phragme´n, E. 1894. Sur une me´thode nouvelle pour re´-
aliser, dans les e´lections, la repre´sentation proportionnelle
des partis. O¨fversigt af Kongliga Vetenskaps-Akademiens
Fo¨rhandlingar 51(3):133–137.
Phragme´n, E. 1895. Proportionella val. En valteknisk studie.
Svenska spo¨rsma˚l 25. Lars Ho¨kersbergs Fo¨rlag.
Phragme´n, E. 1896. Sur la the´orie des e´lections
multiples. O¨fversigt af Kongliga Vetenskaps-Akademiens
Fo¨rhandlingar 53:181–191.
Phragme´n, E. 1899. Till fra˚gan om en proportionell valme-
tod. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 2(2):297–305.
Pukelsheim, F. 2014. Proportional Representation: Appor-
tionment Methods and Their Applications. Springer.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, L., and Fisteus, J. A. 2019. Mono-
tonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 485–
493.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, L.; Elkind, E.; Lackner, M.; Ferna´ndez,
N.; Fisteus, J. A.; Basanta Val, P.; and Skowron, P. 2017.
Proportional justified representation. In Proceedings of the
31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 670–
676.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, L.; Elkind, E.; and Lackner, M. 2018.
Committees providing EJR can be computed efficiently.
Technical report, https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.00356.
Skowron, P.; Lackner, M.; Brill, M.; Peters, D.; and Elkind,
E. 2017. Proportional rankings. In Proceedings of the 26th
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-
CAI), 409–415.
Skowron, P. K.; Faliszewski, P.; and Lang, J. 2016. Find-
ing a collective set of items: From proportional multirepre-
sentation to group recommendation. Artificial Intelligence
241:191–216.
Skowron, P.; Faliszewski, P.; and Slinko, A. 2015. Achiev-
ing fully proportional representation: Approximability re-
sults. Artificial Intelligence 222:67–103.
Speroni di Fenizio, P., and Gewurz, D. A. 2019. The space
of all proportional voting systems and the most majoritarian
among them. Social Choice and Welfare 52(4):663–683.
Thiele, T. N. 1895. Om flerfoldsvalg. Oversigt over det
Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandlinger
415–441.
9
Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows.
In Appendix A we investigate for several candidate-
approval rules whether they fulfill stronger axiomatic prop-
erties in the party-approval subdomain. To this end, we in-
troduce all studied axioms and rules in Appendices A.1
and A.2, respectively, and present the results in Ap-
pendix A.3. Table 1 summarizes the results of this section.
In Appendix B we analyze the introduced axioms and
rules from a computational complexity perspective. First,
we show that computing a committee with maximum PAV
score (which is core stable due to Theorem 2) as well as
computing a winning committee for MaxPhragme´n is still
NP-hard in the party-approval subdomain (Appendix B.1).
Second, we show that a core-stable committee can be com-
puted in polynomial time (Appendix B.2). Third, we provide
polynomial-time algorithms for checking whether a given
committee satisfies EJR or PJR for a party-approval election
(Appendix B.3).
A Axiomatic Study
A.1 Weaker Representation Axioms
Let (N,P,A, k) be a party-approval election andW : P →
N be a committee.
The committee W provides justified representation (JR)
if there is no coalition of voters S ⊆ N of size at least
n/k, all of whose voters commonly approve of a party, but∑
p∈Ai
W (p) = 0 for all i ∈ S. A voting rule satisfies JR if
it returns committees providing JR for every party-approval
election.
The committee W provides proportional justified repre-
sentation (PJR), if there is no coalition of voters S ⊆
N , all of whose voters commonly approve a party, but∑
p∈
⋃
i∈S
Ai
W (p) < q(S). A voting rule satisfies PJR if it
returns committees providing PJR for every party-approval
election.
A.2 Candidate-Approval Rules
In the followingwe introduce approval-based committee vot-
ing rules that were repeatedly studied in the literature. Note
that we use the language of the candidate-approval setting
and in particular,W is a set (not a multiset) of candidates. In
order to apply the described rules in our setting, we can trans-
form any party-approval election to a candidate-approval
election by introducing k clones of each party. For a formal
description of the transformation see Section 4.2 in the main
part of the paper.
Sequential PAV (SeqPAV) and Reverse Sequential PAV
(RevSeqPAV) Additionally to the PAV rule, Thiele pro-
posed two strongly related voting rules which run in poly-
nomial time and greedily try to maximize the PAV score: Se-
qPAV and RevSeqPAV, both of which construct committees
in a sequential manner (Thiele 1895). SeqPAV starts with
the empty committee and iteratively adds the candidate that
increases the PAV score the most, until k candidates are se-
lected. RevSeqPAV initially assumes every candidate to be
winning; afterwards, the candidate whose removal from the
committee decreases the committee’s PAV score the least is
removed, until there are only k candidates left.
Approval Voting (AV) Approval voting is the straightfor-
ward generalization of Approval Voting for single-winner
elections (Brams and Fishburn 2007). The committee con-
sists of the k candidates with the largest number of voters
who approve the respective candidate. Thus, approval vot-
ing returns the set W ⊆ C of size |W | = k that maximizes
the approval score
∑
c∈W |Nc|.
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) SAV selects the
k candidates with the highest satisfaction score s(c) =∑
i∈Nc
1
|Ai|
(Brams and Kilgour 2014). Thereby, SAV out-
puts the committee W ⊆ C with |W | = k that maximizes
the score ∑
i∈N
|Ai ∩W |
|Ai|
.
Minimax Approval Voting (MAV) MAV returns the com-
mittee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance of
the committee to any approval ballot (Brams, Kilgour, and
Sanver 2007). The Hamming distance between a ballot and
a committee is simply the symmetric difference between
the two candidate sets, i.e. d(X,Y ) = |X \ Y | + |Y \
X |. MAV outputs the committee W with minimal score
max{d(W,Ai) : i ∈ N}.
Phragme´n’s rules (MaxPhragme´n, VarPhragme´n, Seq-
Phragme´n, and Phragme´n-STV) Phragme´n’s voting
rules, which were like PAV developed in the late 19th cen-
tury.7 The central concept behind his rules is the idea that ev-
ery candidate in the committee carries some “load”, which
has to be distributed among the voters who approve this
candidate. Phragme´n’s rules then aim to select a committee
where this load can be distributed evenly among the voters.
Following Brill et al. (2017) for the formal definition, we
call a real-valued vector (xi,c)i∈N,c∈C a load distribution if
the following properties hold:
0 6 xi,c 6 1 for i ∈ N, c ∈ C, (1)
xi,c = 0 if c /∈ Ai, (2)∑
i∈N
∑
c∈C
xi,c = k, (3)
∑
i∈N
xi,c ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C. (4)
In this definition, xi,c represents the load of candidate c
on voter i. Thus, the load that voter i carries is
∑
c∈C xi,c.
Properties (3) and (4) ensure that each load distribution cor-
responds to a committee of size k—namely, every candidate
7Phragme´n’s original papers are written in French and Swedish
(Phragme´n 1894; 1895; 1896; 1899); an English account of this
work was composed by Janson (2016).
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whose total load is one is part of the committee, while can-
didates whose total load is zero are not.
There are different ways of measuring how balanced a
load distribution is. This corresponds to different Phragme´n
rules. The first rule MaxPhragme´n minimizes the maxi-
mal total load of any voter. Formally, MaxPhragme´n re-
turns the committee that corresponds to the load distribu-
tion (xi,c) where maxi∈N
∑
c∈Ai
xi,c is minimal.
8 The sec-
ond rule VarPhragme´n minimizes the variance of the voter
loads by computing the load distribution that minimizes∑
i∈N (
∑
c∈Ai
xi,c)
2 and returning the corresponding com-
mittee. The third rule SeqPhragme´n constructs it’s commit-
tee sequentially by starting with an empty committee and
then iteratively adding the candidate that increases the max-
imum voter load the least. See Algorithm 1 for a formal def-
inition.
Algorithm 1 SeqPhragme´n (Candidate-Approval Rule)
function SEQPHRAGME´N(N,C,A, k)
W ← ∅
xi ← 0 for every i ∈ N
while |W | < k do
sc ← (1 +
∑
i∈Nc
xi)/|Nc| for every c ∈ C \W
c∗ ← argminc∈C\W sc
W ←W ∪ {c∗}
xi ← sc∗ for every i ∈ Nc∗
end while
returnW
end function
If we want to make use of MaxPhragme´n or VarPhrag-
me´n in the party-approval setting, we can do so without uti-
lizing the previously described embedding of party-approval
elections into the space of candidate-approval elections. We
do so by simply treating the parties as candidates and slightly
adjusting the definition of a load distribution such that con-
straint (1) becomes 0 6 xi,p 6 k and constraint (4) becomes∑
i∈N xi,c ∈ [k] ∀ p ∈ P .
Additionally, Phragme´n developed a voting rule which is
closely related to the well-known Single Transferable Vote
system (Janson 2016; Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, Elkind, and Lack-
ner 2018; Camps, Mora, and Saumell 2019).We refer to this
rule as Phragme´n-STV; Camps, Mora, and Saumell (2019)
call it the Enestro¨m-Phragme´nmethod. In contrast to the pre-
vious three algorithms, it does not make use of load distribu-
tions. The core idea of the sequential procedure is the follow-
ing: Initially, every voter has weight 1 and every candidate’s
score is the sum of all approving voters’ weights. In every
round, the candidate with the highest score s is added to the
committee. If a voter i with weight fi approves the candi-
date who is added to the committee, then their weight will
be updated to fi ·(s−n/k)/s if s > n/k, and to 0 otherwise.
This process is repeated until all k seats are assigned.
8For technical reasons, the usual lexicographic tie-breaking
does not suffice here and has to be replaced with a more in-
volved tie-breaking mechanism; for details, see the work of Brill
et al. (2017).
Monroe’s rule (MonroeAV and GreedyMonroeAV)
MonroeAV was originally intended for linear preferences
of voters (Monroe 1995). Every voter is represented by ex-
actly one winning candidate, but with the restriction that
every candidate can only represent ⌊n/k⌋ or ⌈n/k⌉ many
voters. Formally, a mapping π : N → W for a given
committee W ⊆ C describes that voter i ∈ N is rep-
resented by π(i). Such a mapping is a valid mapping if
|π−1(c)| ∈ {⌊n/k⌋, ⌈n/k⌉} for all c ∈ W . The score of
a valid mapping π is the number of voters who are repre-
sented in π by a candidate they approve. The Monroe score
of a committeeW ⊆ C is the maximum score of any valid
mapping forW , and MonroeAV returns the committee with
the highest Monroe score.
Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2015) proposed a
greedy variant of MonroeAV, which was later adopted for
the approval setting by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2017). We
refer to this algorithm as GreedyMonroeAV. GreedyMon-
roeAV constructs its committee in k rounds. It is initialized
withN ′ = N andW = ∅. In round t ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the algo-
rithm selects ct ∈ C \W andNt ⊆ N ′ such that the number
of voters in Nt who approve ct is maximal. Meanwhile, Nt
is restricted to be of size ⌈n/k⌉ if t 6 n − k⌊n/k⌋ and to
be of size ⌊n/k⌋ otherwise. At the end of each round, ct is
added toW and the voters in Nt are removed fromN
′.
GreedyAV and HareAV In GreedyAV (Aziz et al. 2017),
the committee is constructed iteratively by adding the candi-
date that satisfies the most voters, who do not approve any
of the previously added candidates. More formally, the al-
gorithm initially starts with A′ = A and W = ∅. While
|W | < k and A′ is nonempty, the candidate c ∈ C \ W
with highest approval score9 with regard to A′ is chosen and
added toW . Then, the ballots of all voters inNc are removed
from A′ and the next candidate is picked analogously. If at
some point |W | < k and A′ is empty, then W is filled up
with arbitrary candidates until |W | = k.
HareAV is a variant of GreedyAV where—after c ∈ C is
added to the committee—not the ballots of all voters in Nc
are removed from A′, but instead only min{⌈n/k⌉, |Nc|}
many ballots are removed.
Chamberlin-Courant’s rule (CCAV) Chamberlin and
Courant (1983) developed a multiwinner voting rule which
was originally defined for voters with linear preferences.We
define an adapted version for the setting of approval votes.
The utility of a voter i for a committeeW is defined to be 1
ifW ∩ Ai 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise. CCAV selects a committee
that maximizes the sum of voters’ utilities.
A.3 Results
We summarize the axiomatic properties of all above intro-
duced voting rules when applied in the party-approval sub-
domain in Table 1. In the following we present the corre-
sponding proofs following the table from top to bottom.
9As usual, ties are broken lexicographically.
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Rule JR PJR EJR Core Stability
PAV ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SeqPAV - - - -
RevSeqPAV - - - -
AV - - - -
SAV - - - -
MAV - - - -
SeqPhragme´n ✓ ✓ - -
MaxPhragme´n ✓ ✓ - -
VarPhragme´n ✓ - - -
Phragme´n-STV ✓ ✓ - -
MonroeAV ✓ - - -
GreedyMonroeAV ✓ - - -
GreedyAV ✓ - - -
HareAV ✓ - - -
CCAV ✓ - - -
Table 1: The table contains a summary of the axiomatic prop-
erties of candidate-approval rules within the subdomain of
party-approval elections.
The proof that PAV satisfies core stability can be found in
Section 4.3 of the main part of the paper.
We start by showing that, equivalently to the candidate-
approval setting, the two greedy variants of PAV, SeqPAV
and RevSeqPAV do not fulfill JR in the party-approval
setting. Indeed, the counterexamples presented by Aziz et
al. (2017) and Aziz (2017) also show that both rules violate
JR for party-elections.
Proposition 5. In party-approval elections, SeqPAV violates
JR for k > 10 and RevSeqPAV violates JR for k > 5.
Proof. The adapted counterexample by Aziz et al. (2017)
has n = 1199 voters and parties P = {P1, . . . , P11}. First,
assume k = 10. The ballot profile is as follows:
81× {P1, P2}, 81× {P1, P3}, 80× {P2},
80× {P3}, 81× {P4, P5}, 81× {P4, P6},
80× {P5}, 80× {P6}, 49× {P7, P8},
49× {P7, P9}, 49× {P7, P10}, 96× {P8},
96× {P9}, 96× {P10}, 120× {P11}.
In the beginning of the SeqPAV computation, both P1 and
P4 have a score of 81 + 81 = 162. As they are approved by
disjoint set of voters, in the first two iterations both parties
receive each one seat. In the third iteration, P7 has the high-
est score of 3·49 = 147 and receives a seat. In the remaining
iterations, P2, P3, P5, P6 have a score of 80 +
81
2 = 120.5,
and P8, P9, P10 have a score of 96 +
49
2 = 120.5, while P11
has only 120 score points. The parties already present in the
committee all have a score smaller than 120. Furthermore,
giving each of the parties with score 120.5 one seat does not
affect the score of the other parties—therefore all of them
receive one seat. Thus, P1, . . . , P10 receive each one seat
in the committee, making the 120 > n/k voters approving
only P11 unrepresented. This violates JR.
For k > 11, one can add k − 10 additional parties
P12, . . . , Pk+1 and 120 ·(k−10) additional voters to the bal-
lot profile, such that for each new party Pj , 12 6 j 6 k + 1,
120 new voters approve only Pj . This does not affect the Se-
qPAV computation described above. After the first ten iter-
ations, the remaining k − 10 seats are given to the parties
P11, . . . , Pk+1. Because there are more parties than seats
left, one of these parties does not receive a seat, resulting
again in 120 cohesive voters who are unrepresented. This
violates JR, as 120 > 120− 1
k
= 1199+120·(k−10)
k
= n/k.
In an analogous way, we can adapt the counterexample
by Aziz (2017), showing that RevSeqPAV violates JR for
k > 5.
When applied in the party-approval setting, the voting
rules AV and SAV select the party with the highest approval
respectively satisfaction score and allocate all available seats
to this party. Evidently, both rules do not satisfy JR. The
same holds for MAV.
Proposition 6. AV, SAV, and MAV violate JR in the party-
approval setting for k > 3.
Proof. For AV and SAV, consider a party-approval election
with two parties A and B, and n = 3k voters with approval
ballots A1 = . . . = A2k = {A}, A2k+1 = . . . = A3k =
{B}. In AV’s and SAV’s committee, A receives all seats,
resulting in k > 3 = n/k uninamous unrepresented voters.
This violates JR.
For MAV, consider an election with four parties
A,B,C,D and n = 2k voters with ballots A1 = . . . =
Ak = {A,B,C}, Ak+1 = . . . = A2k = {D}. JR would
require D to receive at least one seat. However, MAV does
not select such a committee: First, consider the committee
WA where A receives all seats. In the induced candidate-
approval committee, the Hamming distance between any ap-
proval set Ai and the committeeWA is d(WA, Ai) = 2k.
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Secondly, consider any committeeWD whereD has at least
one seat. Then, we have d(WD, A1) > 2k + 2 in the in-
duced candidate-approval election. Thus,WA has a smaller
maximal distance than anyWD . As a result, MAV does not
return a committee that allocates at least one seat to D, a
contradiction to JR.
Proposition 7. SeqPhragme´n fails EJR for k > 282 on
party-approval elections.
Proof. Fix a natural number k > 282. We construct a party-
approval election with parties A,B,C,D,E,X . The ballot
profile of the n = 2k many voters is as follows:
1× {A,X}, 1× {B,X}, 1× {C,X}, 1× {D,X},
7× {A,B,C,D}, (2k − 11)× {E}.
We first ignore the voters approvingE and focus on the 11 re-
maining ones. Initially, adding a seat toA,B,C, orD would
increase the maximal voter load to 18 , while giving X one
seat would increase it to 14 . Without loss of generality, as-
sumeA receives this seat. Then, giving the next seat toB,C,
10Keep in mind that in the induced candidate-approval election,
the approval sets contain k copies of every party as candidates.
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or D would increase the maximal load to (78 + 1) ·
1
8 =
15
64 ;
giving it to A would increase it to 1+18 =
16
64 , and giving
the seat to X would increase it to
1
8
+1
4 =
18
64 . Thus, we can
assume B receives the seat. Analogously, the next two seats
are allocated to C and D, respectively—the exact computa-
tions can be found in Table 2. The fifth seat would then be
allocated again to A, increasing the maximal voter load to
16473
32768 ≈ 0.50272.
Taking the voters for E into account would not affect the
computation above, because all voters who approveE do not
approve any other party. Thus, in every SeqPhragme´n itera-
tion, either E receives a seat or one of A,B,C,D receives a
seat, until A,B,C,D all have one seat. Adding a seat to E
increases the load of a voter approvingE by 12k−11 . Thus, if
k − 4 seats are allocated to E, each E-voter would have a
load of k−42k−11 . Observe that limk→∞
k−4
2k−11 =
1
2 and indeed,
k−4
2k−11 < 0.50272 for all k > 282. Therefore, SeqPhragme´n
returns a committee where A,B,C,D each receive one seat
and E receives the remaining k − 4 seats.
This is a contradiction to EJR: Since n/k = 2, EJR de-
mands one of the four voters approvingX to be represented
at least twice in the committee. This is not the case in the
committee selected by SeqPhragme´n.
In order to prove that MaxPhragme´n and VarPhragme´n
violate EJR, we take a detour of arguing that another
proportional representation axiom (introduced by Sa´nchez-
Ferna´ndez et al. 2017) which is incompatible to EJR in
the candidate-approval setting remains incompatible to EJR
in the party-approval setting. Since MaxPhragme´n and
VarPhragme´n fulfill this property, this suffices to prove our
claim.
The axiom reflects the idea that every candidate represents
n/k voters who are all approve of this representation. More
precisely, given an election (N,C,A, k) where k divides n,
a committee W satisfies perfect representation (PR) if it is
possible to partition the voters into distinct sets N1, . . . , Nk
all of size n/k and assign to each Nq, q ∈ {1, . . . , k}, a
different winning candidate cq ∈ W such that all voters in
Nq approve cq. A voting rule satisfies PR if it always returns
a committee that satisfies PR, whenever such a committee
exists.
The proof by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2017) showing
that EJR and PR are incompatible for candidate-approval
elections can be adapted straightforwardly to the party-
approval subdomain by interpreting candidates as parties.
Proposition 8. There exists no party-approval voting rule
which satisfies EJR and PR.
Phragme´n’s optimization rules, MaxPhragme´n and Var-
Phragme´n, both satisfy PR in the candidate-approval setting
(Brill et al. 2017) and hence also in the party-approval set-
ting.
Corollary 9. MaxPhragme´n and VarPhragme´n do not sat-
isfy EJR for party-approval elections.
In the following we show that also Phragme´n-STV does
not show improved axiomatic properties for party-approval
elections.
Proposition 10. Phragme´n-STV fails EJR for k > 18 on
party-approval elections.
Proof. For k > 18, consider an election with n = 120k
voters and k+1 parties A,X1, . . . , Xk. The ballot profile is
as follows:
120× {A,X1},
120× {A,X2},
122× {X1, X3},
70× {X2, X4},
120× {X4, X5},
121× {X5, X6},
61× {X3},
50× {X4},
65× {X6},
109× {Xj} for j ∈ {7, . . . , 15},
110× {Xj} for j ∈ {16, 17, 18}.
If k > 18, we also add 120 voters approving {Xj} for every
j ∈ {19, . . . , k}.
At first, let us only consider the parties A,X1, . . . , X6.
In Table 3, the Phragme´n-STV calculation for an election
restricted to these parties is described. Note that in the first 6
iterations, the parties X1, . . . , X6 each receive one seat and
all have, when selected as winners, a score that exceeds 120.
Afterwards, every party has a score strictly smaller than 109.
Furthermore, observe that the parties X7, . . . , Xk are all
approved by voters who only approve this one particular
party. As a result, their scores are not affected when other
parties receive a seat. The parties X7, . . . , X15 have a score
of 109, X16, X17, X18 a score of 110, and X19, . . . , Xk (if
existing) a score of 120. When any of these parties receive
a seat, their score is decreased to 0, as they are all approved
by at most n/k voters.
Together, this shows that Phragme´n-STV firstly allots
each one seat to X1, . . . , X6. Then, the score of the par-
ties A,X1, . . . , X6 is always smaller than 109, and there-
fore, X7, . . . , Xk all receive a seat, which fills the com-
mittee. Thus, in the committee selected by Phragme´n-STV,
X1, . . . , Xk each receive one seat. However, the 240 =
2n/k voters who approve A form a cohesive group, where
at least one voter should be represented by at least two seats
according to EJR. This is not the case in the committee gen-
erated by Phragme´n-STV.
Proposition 11. GreedyAV and CCAV do not satisfy PJR for
k > 3 on party-approval elections.
Proof. Regarding GreedyAV with k > 3, consider an elec-
tion with n = 3k many voters and a parties A,X1, . . . , Xk.
The ballots are Ai = {Xi} for 1 6 i 6 k and Ai = {A}
for k < i 6 3k. GreedyAV first gives one seat to party A
and afterwards k − 1 many seats, each to a different party
from {X1, . . . , Xk}. Then,N∗ = {k + 1, . . . , n} is a set of
2k many voters with equal ballot who are only represented
by one approved candidate. However, for ℓ = 2 we have
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Party Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 Iteration 4 Iteration 5
A 0.125 0.25 0.34570 0.42944 0.50272
B 0.125 0.23438 0.35938 0.44312 0.51639
C 0.125 0.23438 0.33008 0.45508 0.52835
D 0.125 0.23438 0.33008 0.41382 0.53882
X 0.25 0.28125 0.33984 0.42236 0.52582
Table 2: The SeqPhragme´n computation for the profile in Proposition 7, when the partyE is ignored. The table shows the values
of sp for a party p in the first five iterations, rounded to five significant digits. The bold entries denote which party receives a
seat (with lexicographic tie-breaking).
Party Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7
A 240.0 179.86 179.86 103.26 103.26 103.26 103.26
X1 242.0 120.71 120.71 120.71 120.71 120.71 60.14
X2 190.0 190.0 190.0 68.71 45.96 45.96 45.96
X3 183.0 121.86 121.86 121.86 121.86 121.86 0.57
X4 240.0 240.0 179.61 134.92 13.64 13.64 13.64
X5 241.0 241.0 119.71 119.71 66.13 7.86 7.86
X6 186.0 186.0 125.11 125.11 125.11 3.82 3.82
Table 3: The Phragme´n-STV computation for the restricted profile in Proposition 10. The table shows the scores of the parties
in the first seven iterations. The bold entries denote the party with the highest score.
2k > 6 = ℓn/k and therefore PJR claims that the voters in
N∗ must be represented by at least two seats.
It is not hard to see that, for the above constructed election,
CCAV selects the same committee like GreedyAV. To see
this note that the CCAV-utility of this committee is 3k − 1.
Now, consider a committee which gives two seats to one of
the parties. Such a committee has a CCAV-utility of at most
3k − 2. Hence, both GreedyAV and CCAV fail PJR.
Proposition 12. MonroeAV, GreedyMonroeAV and HareAV
violate PJR for k > 6 on party-approval elections.
Proof. For k > 6, consider an election with n = k + 3 vot-
ers and parties A,X1, . . . , Xk−3. In the election, 6 voters
approve only A; furthermore for j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 3}, there
is one voter who approves only Xj . For this election, Mon-
roeAV, GreedyMonroeAV and HareAV all return a commit-
tee whereA receives 3 seats, and the remaining seats are dis-
tributed amongX1, . . . , Xk−3 (none of them receives more
than one seat).
Since for k > 6 there are 6 > 4+ 12
k
= 4n/kmany voters
approving only A, PJR would demand 4 seats for A. This is
not satisfied by the computed committee.
B Computational Aspects
B.1 Hardness of PAV and MaxPhragme´n in the
Party-Approval Subdomain
We show NP-hardness by reduction from the classical NP-
complete problem INDEPENDENT SET (Garey and Johnson
1979).
INDEPENDENT SET
Input: Undirected graphG = (V,E), t ∈ N.
Question: Is there a vertex subset V ′ ⊆ V of size
|V ′| = t such that no two vertices in V ′ are
connected by an edge in G?
This problem is NP-hard even when restricted to cubic
graphs (where every vertex has degree 3). With this defini-
tion in mind, the two hardness results can be formulated.
Our reduction is a simplified version of the reduction pro-
posed by Aziz et al. (2015, Theorem 1).
Theorem 13. For a given threshold s, deciding whether
there exists a committee with PAV score at least s is NP-hard
in the party-approval subdomain.
Proof. For a given graph G = (V,E) and independent
set size t ∈ N, we construct a party-approval election
(N,P,A, k) is constructed. For each vertex v ∈ V , there is a
fresh party pv ∈ P . For every edge e = {u, v} ∈ E, there is
one voter in N who approves exactly pu and pv . Let deg(v)
be the degree of v, and let deg(G) denote the maximal vertex
degree ofG. Then, for every v ∈ V , insert deg(G)− deg(v)
many additional dummy voters who each approve only pv.
Lastly, we set k = t.
This reduction is obviously polynomial in the size of G.
We show thatG has an independent set of size t iff there is a
committeeW for the election (N,P,A, k)with PAV(W ) >
s = deg(G) t.
“⇒”: Assume that G has an independent set V ′ ⊆ V of
size |V ′| = t. Consider the committee W where for every
vertex v ∈ V ′, the party pv receives exactly one seat (thus,
the committee has the proper size k = t). Each party pv is
approved by deg(G) − deg(v) many dummy voters and by
deg(v) many edge voters. Because V ′ is an independent set,
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no voter approvesmore than one party in the committee, and
thus only has a single seat on the committee belonging to an
approved party. Consequently, the total PAV score of W is
exactly deg(G) t.
“⇐”: Assume that W is a committee with PAV(W ) >
deg(G) t for the constructed election. Every party pv is ap-
proved by exactly deg(G) many voters and therefore, giving
one seat to pv in the committee can increase the PAV-score
by at most deg(G). As there are only t seats available, ev-
ery seat assignment has to increase the PAV-score by exactly
deg(G). In order to achieve an increase of deg(G) when
adding a seat to pv, all the voters who approve pv must have
been previously completely unrepresented. Thus, all parties
present inW receive only one seat and do not have any com-
mon approving voters. By construction, this implies that the
set of vertices {v ∈ V : W (pv) > 0} corresponding to W
is an independent set of size t.
Theorem 14. Computing a winning committee for Max-
Phragme´n is NP-hard in the party-approval subdomain.
Proof. We prove that the following problem is NP-hard:
PARTY APPROVAL MAXPHRAGME´N
Input: party-approval election (N,P,A, k), distribu-
tion bound s ∈ R.
Question: Is there a load distribution (xi,p) such that
maxi∈N
∑
p∈Ai
xi,p 6 s?
Recall that we consider the adjusted definition of load dis-
tributions in the party-approval setting, which we introduced
in Appendix A.2. Similarly to Theorem 13, we use a poly-
nomial reduction from INDEPENDENT SET, this time taking
advantage of the fact that INDEPENDENT SET is NP-hard
even on cubic graphs. The reduction is a variant of the one
by Brill et al. (2017), which shows that MaxPhragme´n is
NP-hard in the candidate-approval setting.
Given a cubic graphG = (V,E) and independent set size
t ∈ N, we define the following party-approval election: For
every vertex v ∈ V , there is a party pv ∈ P . Additionally,
for every edge e = {u,w} ∈ E, there is a voter in N who
approves exactly pu and pw. The committee shall be as large
as the independent set, that is, k = t. To prove that this
reduction is sound, we show that G has an independent set
of size t if and only if there is a load distribution (xi,p) with
maxi∈N
∑
p∈Ai
xi,p 6
1
3 .
“⇒”: Assume G has an independent set V ′ ⊆ V of size
|V ′| = t. Because G is cubic, every party in the created
election is approved by exactly 3 voters. We define a valid
load distribution, in which every party corresponding to a
vertex in V ′ creates a load of 13 on every approving voter.
(This also implies that in the induced committee, the parties
corresponding to V ′ receive exactly one seat.) Because V ′
is an independent set, no voter receives load from multiple
parties, and hence the maximal total load of every voter is 13 .
“⇐”: Assume there is a load distribution (xi,p) such that
maxi∈N
∑
p∈Ai
xi,p 6
1
3 . Since every party is approved by
exactly 3 voters, it follows that xi,p =
1
3 for a voter i who
approves a party p that receives a seat in the induced com-
mittee. Consequently, no party receives more than one seat
in the induced committee and no voter approves more than
one party in the committee. Thus, the committee induces the
independent set {v ∈ V : xi,pv >0 for some i ∈ N} of size
t.
B.2 Efficient Computation of Core-Stable
Committees
In the following we prove that in the party-approval sub-
domain, core-stable committees can be computed in poly-
nomial time. We make use of a local search procedure,
introduced for the candidate-approval setting by Aziz et
al. (2018), which approximates a local maximum of the PAV
score function. Aziz et al. (2018) show that their algorithm
runs in polynomial time and returns committees providing
EJR. For party-approval elections, we show that, by a minor
adjustment of the algorithm, committees computed by LS-
PAV fulfill core stability. In Algorithm 2 we slightly adjust
the original definition by parameterizing the procedure by
the approximation threshold ǫ. Note that, once again, the al-
gorithm is defined in terms of candidate-approval elections;
in Section 4.2 we show how to apply candidate-approval
rules to party-approval elections.
Algorithm 2 LS-PAV (Candidate-Approval Rule)
function LS-PAV(N,C,A, k, ǫ)
W←k arbitrary candidates from C
while
∃ c ∈W, c ∈ C\W such that
PAV (W \{c}∪{c′}) > PAV (W )+ǫ
do
W ←W \ {c} ∪ {c′}
end while
returnW
end function
Theorem 4. Given a party-approval election, a core-stable
committee can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we show that LS-PAV
with threshold ǫ = 1(1+2(k−1))(k−1)k always selects a com-
mittee W from the core when k > 1. Computing a core-
stable committee for k = 1 is trivial. The proof is an adjust-
ment of the proof of Theorem 2.
We define the utility of voter i w.r.t. committee W as
ui(W ) =
∑
p∈Ai
W (p). For some party-approval election
(N,P,A, k) letW be a committee selected by LS-PAV with
ǫ and assume that W is not core stable. Hence, there exists
S ⊆ N , T : P → N, ℓ ∈ [k] with |S| > ℓ n/k, |T | = ℓ and
ui(T ) > ui(W ) ∀ i ∈ S. (5)
Following the proof of Theorem 2, we define the marginal
contribution of a party p to the PAV score ofW
MC (p,W ) = PAV(W )− PAV(W − {p})
=
∑
i∈N : p∈Ai
1
ui(W )
and obtain an upper bound for the sum of the marginal con-
tribution of all seats inW w.r.t.W , i.e.,∑
p∈P
W (p) ·MC (p,W ) 6 n (6)
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as well as a lower bound for the sum of marginal contribu-
tion of all seats in T toW + {p}, where p is the party corre-
sponding to the seat,i.e.,
∑
p∈P
T (P ) ·MC (p,W + {p}) > |S|. (7)
Hence, there exists a party p1 in the support ofW for which
MC (p1,W ) 6 n/k (8)
and there exists a party p2 in the support of T for which
MC (p2,W + {p2}) > n/k (9)
holds. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: It holds that
1. ∃ p1 in supp. ofW : MC (p1,W ) 6 n/k − ǫ or
2. ∃ p2 in supp. of T : MC (p2,W + {p2}) > n/k + ǫ.
W.l.o.g. assume that the first condition is fulfilled. Then,
we choose p1 such that the condition is fulfilled and p2
such that Eq. (9) holds. Observe that the set W ′ = W −
{p1}+{p2} yields a PAV score of more than PAV (W )+
ǫ, a contradiction to the termination of LS-PAV.
PAV(W ′)
= PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W−{p1}+{p2})
> PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W+{p2})
> PAV(W ) + ǫ
The last inequality follows from case condition 1 and
Eq. (9). If the second condition holds, an analogous ar-
gument yields a contradiction.
Case 2: It holds that
1. ∀ p1 in supp. ofW : MC (p1,W ) > n/k − ǫ and
2. ∀ p2 in supp. of T : MC (p2,W+{p2})<n/k+ǫ and
3. ∃ i ∈ S : ui(W ) > 0.
Applying Eq. (6) and case condition 1 we obtain an upper
bound forMC (p1,W ) for any p1 in the support ofW :
MC (p1,W )
6 n−
∑
p∈P\p1
W (p) MC (p,W )
−(W (p1)−1) MC (p1,W )
< n− (k − 1)
(n
k
− ǫ
)
=
n
k
+ (k − 1)ǫ. (10)
Analogously, applying Eq. (7) and case condition 2 we
obtain an lower bound forMC (p2,W + {p2}) for any p2
in the support of T :
MC (p2,W + {p2})
> |S| −
∑
p∈P\p2
T (p) MC (p,W + {p})
− (T (p2)− 1) MC (p2,W + {p2})
> |S| − (l − 1)
(n
k
+ ǫ
)
>
n
k
− (k − 1)ǫ. (11)
Subsequently, choose some i ∈ S with ui(W ) > 0 (exis-
tence guaranteed by case condition 3) and a party p1 from
the support of W which is also included in the approval
set of voter i,Ai. Then, choose a party p2 in the support of
T which is also approved by voter i but W (p2) < T (p2)
(existence guaranteed by the fact that voter i prefers com-
mittee T to committee W ). Please note that the restric-
tions made by case conditions 1 and 2 already imply that
p1 and p2 are different parties.
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For this choice of p1 and p2 we aim to show that the con-
tribution of p2 with respect toW −{p1}+ {p2} is strictly
bounded away from the contribution of p2 with respect to
W + {p2}. More precisely,
MC (p2,W−{p1}+{p2})>MC (p2,W+{p2})+
1
k(k−1)
.
(12)
To this end recall that voter i supports party p1 and hence
ui(W − {p1}) = ui(W )− 1. (13)
Moreover, for all remaining voters j ∈ N \ {i} it holds
uj(W − {p1}) 6 uj(W ). (14)
Lastly, from i being in the deviator set S, we know that
ui(W ) 6 k − 1. (15)
For ease of presentation we defineNp : {i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}
as the supporters of party p and N−ip = Np \ {i} as the
supporters of party pwithout voter i. Putting it all together
we get
MC (p2,W−{p1}+{p2})
=
∑
j∈Np2
1
uj(W−{p1}) + 1
=
∑
j∈N−ip2
1
uj(W−{p1}) + 1
+
1
ui(W−{p1}) + 1
>
∑
j∈N−ip2
1
uj(W )+1
+
1
ui(W )
=
∑
j∈N−ip2
1
uj(W )+1
+
1
ui(W )+1
+
1
(ui(W )+1)ui(W )
> MC (p2,W + {p2}) +
1
k(k − 1)
.
The first inequality holds due to Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) and
the second due to Eq. (15).
11Assume for contradiction that p1 and p2 are the same parties.
Then, in particular it holds that MC (p1,W ) = MC (p2,W ) and
MC (p1,W + {p1}) = MC (p2,W + {p2}). Consider the dif-
ference MC (p1,W ) −MC (p1,W + {p1}). Note that we do not
do any further assumptions in order to derive Eq. (12). Preempting
Eq. (12), we know that MC (p1,W ) − MC (p1,W + {p1}) >
1
k(k−1)
holds, but on the other hand we get from Eq. (10) and
Eq. (11) that MC (p1,W ) − MC (p1,W + {p1}) 6 2(k − 1)ǫ
holds, a contradiction.
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Finally, making use of Eqs. (10) to (12), we can show that
the committeeW ′ = W−{p1}+{p2} yields a PAV score
that is greater than PAV(W ) + ǫ, a contradiction.
PAV(W ′)
= PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W−{p1}+{p2})
> PAV(W )−MC (p1,W )+MC (p2,W+{p2})+
1
k(k−1)
> PAV(W )−
n
k
−(k − 1)ǫ+
n
k
−(k − 1)ǫ+
1
k(k − 1)
= PAV(W )− 2(k − 1)ǫ+
1
k(k − 1)
= PAV(W ) + ǫ
The first inequality is due to Eq. (12) and the second due
to Eqs. (10) and (11).
Case 3: Finally, suppose that we are neither in Case 1
nor in Case 2. It follows that
∑
i∈S ui(W ) = 0 but∑
i∈S ui(T ) > |S|. Hence, there exists some p2 in the
support of T with at least |S|/|T | > n/k supporters in S.
This is a contradiction to the fact that LS-PAV fulfills EJR
(and hence JR).12
It remains to show that LS-PAV for ǫ = 1(1+2(k−1))(k−1)k
runs in polynomial time. We follow the proof by Aziz et
al. (2018) showing that LS-PAV runs in polynomial time for
ǫ′ = n/k2. First note that the computations within every
iteration of the algorithm run in polynomial time. It remains
to show that the number of iterations is polynomial in n and
k. The PAV score of a committee is upper bounded by n ·
Hk ∈ O(n ln k). The algorithm improves the PAV score of a
committee in every iteration by at least ǫ. Hence, the running
time is in O(nk3 ln k).
B.3 Complexity of Checking EJR and PJR
Theorem 15. Given a party-approval election (N,P,A, k)
and a committee W : P → N, it can be checked in polyno-
mial time whetherW satisfies EJR.
Proof. A committee W violates EJR iff there is a party
p ∈ P and an integer 1 6 ℓ 6 k such that there is a set
S of voters supporting p of size at least ℓ n/k but such that∑
p′∈Ai
W (p′) < ℓ for every voter i ∈ S. This condition
can be checked in polynomial time.
For each such party p and integer ℓ, compute the num-
ber of voters supporting p who have a utility of less than ℓ.
If this number is at least ℓ n/k at any point, a violation of
EJR was found. Else, W provides EJR. A straightforward
implementation of this algorithm has polynomial running
time O(|P | k n).
Checking PJR is slightly more involved, and uses tech-
niques from submodular optimization. To recall, given a fi-
nite set U , a function f : 2U → R is submodular if for all
12For a proof, see the paper by Aziz et al. (2018). Note that the
paper shows that LS-PAV fulfills EJR when ǫ′ = n
k2
. Since ǫ 6 ǫ′
for all k > 2, their result carries over to LS-PAV with ǫ.
subsetsX,Y ⊆ U with X ⊆ Y and for every x ∈ U \ Y , it
holds that
f(X ∪ {x})− f(X) > f(Y ∪ {x})− f(Y ).
A submodular function f : 2U → Z can be minimized in
time polynomial in |U | + logmax{|f(S)| : S ⊆ U} (Ko-
rte and Vygen 2018, Theorem 14.19). Applying this propo-
sition, one can check whether a party-approval committee
provides PJR in polynomial time.
Theorem 16. Given a party-approval election (N,P,A, k)
and a committee W : P → N, it can be checked in polyno-
mial time whetherW satisfies PJR.
Proof. Fix W : P → N. At first, we define a function s :
2N → N such that
s(S) =
∑
p∈
⋃
i∈S
Ai
W (p).
For any voter group S ⊆ N , s(S) is the total number of
seats that W allocates to parties approved by some voter in
S.
W satisfies PJR iff there is no party p, integer 1 6 ℓ 6 k,
and voter group S jointly approving p such that |S| > ℓ n/k
and s(S) < ℓ. We show how to check in polynomial time for
a fixed party p, whether there exists such a group of voters S.
Then, this check can be repeated for every party contained
in P in order to check ifW satisfies PJR, which in total still
requires polynomial time.
In the algorithm, submodular optimizationwill be utilized.
Fix a party p ∈ P , and let Np be the set of all voters who
approve p. We define a function f : 2Np → R such that
f(S) = s(S)− |S|
k
n
.
As the sum of a (submodular) coverage function s and a lin-
ear function, f is submodular. By multiplying f by n, we
obtain an integer-valued function; thus, we can minimize f
in polynomial time.
Intuitively, s(S) is the number of seats the voters in S are
represented by in W . To satisfy PJR, every coherent voter
group of size ℓ n k has to be represented by at least ℓ seats.
Thus, ⌊|S| k/n⌋ is the number of seats S should be rep-
resented by according to PJR. Consequently, f(S) = −1
means that the voter group S is represented by one less
seat than it should be in order to satisfy PJR. Formally, any
S ⊆ Np is the witness of a PJR violation iff f(S) 6 −1,
which we show in the following.
“⇒”: Assume that S ⊆ Np shows a violation of PJR,
that is |S| > ℓ n/k and s(S) < ℓ for some integer ℓ. Then,
s(S) 6 ℓ − 1 and |S| k/n must be at least ℓ. This implies
f(S) 6 ℓ− 1− ℓ = −1.
“⇐”: Fix some S ⊆ Np with f(S) 6 −1. It follows
that s(S) 6 |S| k/n − 1. This directly implies that s(S) <
⌊|S| k/n⌋. This shows a violation of PJR.
All in all, the procedure to check PJR can be summarized
as follows: Iterate over every party p ∈ P . For each party,
minimize the function f in polynomial time. If any function
f has a minimal value f(S) 6 −1, thenW violates PJR. If
the minimal value of f is always greater than −1, then W
satisfies PJR.
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